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NOT WAITING FOR SUPERMAN: LESSONS FOR
UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT LITIGANTS FROM

STATE EX REL. BALDERAS V. ITT
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES
Lionel Conrad Betsch ∗

INTRODUCTION
In State ex rel. Balderas v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., the New Mexico
Court of Appeals applied public policy under the Unfair Practices Act (hereinafter
“UPA” or “Act”) to void both an arbitration provision and the confidentiality clause
contained therein. 1 The status of the plaintiff Attorney General was dispositive to the
court’s analysis, and therefore the court did not reach the question of whether a
private UPA plaintiff would likewise be able to defeat a defendant’s motion to
enforce an arbitration provision. 2 However, that question has potential significance
for future UPA plaintiffs, especially as arbitration provisions have become popular
contract provisions to preclude or obstruct lawsuits. 3 This Comment argues that,
depending on the facts of the specific case, such a private UPA plaintiff could prevail
based on legislative intent, public policy, and courts’ equitable application of the
UPA.
Imagine a high school graduate enrolls in a for-profit college on the basis
of the institution’s misleading advertising. Perhaps late-night television spots entice
this student by making inflated claims about employers’ regard for the college’s
degrees; by deceptively implying that many high-paying jobs await the college’s
alumni; or by falsely suggesting that the college’s placement services will ensure
∗
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especially thank Professors Carol M. Suzuki and J. Walker Boyd, as well as my Law Review colleagues.
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1. State ex rel. Balderas v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 2018-NMCA-044, ¶¶ 16–18, 421 P.3d 849, 855
(“[W]e conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, it would be contrary to public policy to allow
ITT to use the confidentiality clause with its students to shield itself from the State’s investigation and
litigation authorized under the UPA. . . . ITT’s appeal of the order denying its motion to compel arbitration
fails for the same reason.”). Such contractual violations of public policy have been defined by courts as
patently offensive to the public good; clearly and unmistakably repugnant to the public interest; injurious
to the interests of the public, or in contravention of some established interest of society or some public
statute; and against good morals, or tending to interfere with public welfare. See 17A Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 238 (2020).
2. State ex rel. Balderas, 2018-NMCA-044, ¶¶ 16–18, 421 P.3d at 854–55.
3. See Christopher R. Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate, 96 N.C. L. REV. 381, 393 (stating that the
inability of consumers to avoid arbitration clauses can fundamentally undermine laws designed to protect
consumer interests).
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prompt employment upon graduation. The educational consumer who enrolls on the
strength of these claims will not be in a position to negotiate or amend his or her
terms of enrollment, including the institution’s adhesive forms. Whether or not this
consumer has program options elsewhere, the student may very well feel compelled
to sign the proffered and mandatory enrollment forms that include arbitration
provisions.
Now imagine the student approaches graduation and discovers that the
educational degree has very limited value, contrary to the claims that drew him or
her to the institution. In addition, the student has amassed significant debt and the
school’s placement services fall far below reasonable expectations. That student
might then pursue a legal claim under the UPA against the for-profit college for
“using exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact or failing to state a
material fact if doing so deceives or tends to deceive.” 4 In response, the college
invokes an arbitration clause contained within the original student enrollment
agreement to block the plaintiff’s discovery and litigation, contrary to the legitimate
purpose of such a provision. Is this fair? More importantly, does the private litigant
have the legal means to void the institution’s attempt to use the arbitration provision
as a shield against litigation for its alleged unfair practices?
This Case Comment discusses the implications of ITT Educational Services
for private UPA litigants who face a motion to enforce an arbitration agreement to
block their litigation and proposes the arguments that could prevail against such a
motion. First, Part I describes the ITT Educational Services decision in detail and
examines its immediate implications. Next, Part II provides relevant background
information by discussing the UPA’s legislative history and examples of some of the
statute’s acknowledged policy interests. Part III examines UPA claims in practice, in
particular courts’ application of equity toward achieving public policy goals. Part IV
then proposes the related strategies for a hypothetical UPA litigant to pursue against
such enforcement of arbitration contrary to public policy.
PART I – ITT EDUCATIONAL SERVICES
A. Procedural Posture and Factual Background
Now bankrupt, ITT Educational Services, Inc., d/b/a ITT Technical
Institute (hereinafter “ITT”), stands accused of violations of the UPA arising from
alleged misrepresentations to students about its nursing program and financial aid
process. 5 At the trial court, ITT argued that the plaintiff Attorney General
(hereinafter “AG”) was bound by the arbitration provision in the ITT student
enrollment agreement despite not being a party to the agreement. 6 The arbitration
provision specifies that “any dispute arising out of or in any way related” to the
agreement “including without limitation, any statutory, tort, contract or equity claim”
be resolved by binding arbitration. 7 ITT asserted that the AG was bound by the
binding arbitration provision because his claims were derived from student claims or

4.
5.
6.
7.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(14) (2019).
State ex rel. Balderas, 2018-NMCA-044, ¶ 2, 421 P.3d at 851.
Id.
Id.
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were brought in a representative capacity on behalf of students. 8 On this basis, ITT
filed a motion asking the trial court to compel arbitration by the State for each
individual student represented in the claim. 9
The AG had filed subpoenas duces tecum to discover information from prior
arbitration proceedings brought by ITT students against the institution. 10 ITT
objected to the subpoenas on two grounds relating to the arbitration provision and its
confidentiality clause. 11 First, ITT claimed that the subpoenas would violate student
privacy. 12 Second, ITT claimed that the informal nature of the arbitration process
rendered parties less careful than in litigation, and thus keeping arbitration
proceedings confidential served public policy. 13
In weighing both sides’ arguments, the trial court expressed both student
privacy concerns and concern against using contract provisions to block discovery.
“I understand confidentiality agreements. I understand arbitration agreements
between parties. . . . I don’t have a problem with the concept of the confidentiality
agreement, but I do have a problem with using it as a shield.” 14 ITT was unable to
provide authority for a trial court’s enforcement of such a confidentiality clause
against discovery by “an investigative or enforcement agency like the Attorney
General . . . pursuant to its statutory authority.” 15 The trial court granted the State’s
motion to compel production, 16 and ITT timely appealed pursuant to the New
Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act (hereinafter “NMUAA”), NMSA 1978, § 44-7A29(a)(1) (2001). 17
B. Interlocutory Appeal
In weighing the enforceability of the arbitration provision and
confidentiality clause with respect to UPA claims, the Court of Appeals reviewed
the case de novo for several pertinent reasons. First, de novo is the required standard
of review for interpretation of all relevant contract terms. 18 Second, a court
determination regarding a contract being against public policy “‘is a question of law
for the court to determine from all the circumstances of each case,’ considering both
statutory and judicial expressions of public policy.” 19 In addition, the court applies a
de novo standard “‘to a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration[,]’ as
well as to the applicability and construction of a contractual provision requiring
arbitration.” 20 These considerations demonstrate that the court conducted its analysis
with full awareness of contract and public policy concerns, whereas the status of the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 433 P.3d at 851.
Id. ¶¶ 3–5, 433 P.3d at 851–52.
Id. ¶ 5, 433 P.3d at 852.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2, 433 P.3d at 851.
Id. ¶ 8, 433 P.3d at 852.
Id. (quoting Castillo v. Arrieta, 2016-NMCA-040, ¶ 15, 368 P.3d 1249, 1254).
Id. (quoting Piano v. Premier Distrib. Co., 2005-NMCA-018, ¶ 4, 107 P.3d 11, 13).
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Attorney General plaintiff was not a distinct factor regarding the standard of review.
Thus, a private UPA litigant would not face a different standard of review due to
lacking the AG’s status with respect to the Act.
The court first took up the issue of the State’s motion to compel compliance
with its subpoenas. 21 ITT argued for enforcement of the arbitration provision and the
confidentiality clause therein based on the Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter
“FAA”) and on public policy favoring arbitration. 22 The State argued that the trial
court’s ruling comported with New Mexico’s broad discovery rules. 23 The State
further asserted that ITT should not be allowed to invoke the arbitration provision’s
confidentiality clause as a shield against its statutorily mandated investigation and
enforcement obligations as authorized by the UPA. 24
(1) Discussion of the FAA
Regarding ITT’s argument, the Court of Appeals analyzed the FAA’s
purpose and potential preemption of state law. 25 The court cited the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recognition of the FAA’s purpose “‘to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements’ and ‘to place arbitration agreements upon the
same footing as other contracts.’” 26 The court then quoted the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s recognition of the FAA’s power to “preempt[] not only state laws that
prohibit arbitration outright, but also state laws that stand ‘as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” 27
However, the court then recognized that the FAA does not completely displace state
law that governs contract formation and enforcement, and it does not make
arbitration agreements more enforceable than other contracts. 28 Therefore, the court
concluded, arbitration provisions—like other contract provisions—are subject to
generally applicable contract defenses, including fraud, duress, and
unconscionability. 29
In clarifying the scope of the FAA, the court repeatedly cited Strausberg
and Rivera, including those cases’ recognitions of the holding in Waffle House. 30
These citations to U.S. Supreme Court caselaw served plausible purposes beyond
establishing the New Mexico Supreme Court’s own framework of authority and
credibility. The court also may have been signaling that New Mexico’s UPA
jurisprudence is cognizant of the U.S. Supreme Court’s FAA ruling and does not
stand in contradiction to that ruling. As well, the court may have been signaling that
the New Mexico Supreme Court has experience in analyzing the UPA against the
full purposes and objectives of Congress, further precluding a potential argument
21. Id. ¶ 9, 433 P.3d at 852–53.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 433 P.3d at 852–53.
25. Id. ¶ 12, 433 P.3d at 853–54.
26. Id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)).
27. Id. (quoting Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 55, 304 P.3d
409, 423 (quoting Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 17, 259 P.3d 803, 810)).
28. Id. (citing Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 52, 304 P.3d at 422).
29. Id. (citing Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 17, 259 P.3d at 810).
30. Id.
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that the court here ignores Concepcion. 31 Finally, the court’s citations here also
included a signal to the Fourth Circuit’s shared view of the outer reach of the FAA’s
scope, likely communicating that the court’s position is consistent with federal
rulings. 32
(2) Discussion of the State’s Competing Contract Interests
The court stated that in New Mexico, the enforceability of a contract relies
on the balancing of two competing interests: freedom of contract and the public
interest against any contract that is contrary to public policy. 33 The New Mexico
Supreme Court recognized the State’s commitment to freedom of contract such that
contracts must be enforced unless they “clearly contravene some law or rule of public
morals.” 34 The Supreme Court has also stated that it “jealously guard[s]” the right to
contract, but a contractual clause that clearly contravenes a positive rule of law
cannot be enforced. 35 The court further cited the Supreme Court’s position that
invalidation of a contract may be favored by public policy that originates from either
statutory or common law. 36 The court then demonstrated that New Mexico public
policy can invalidate contract terms that are contrary to statutory provisions by citing
five examples from four New Mexico Supreme Court cases. 37 Significantly, none of
these cases involved the State as a party nor the statutory authority of the AG. 38
(3)

Discussion of the UPA & Public Policy

Having established that New Mexico statutory authority can be the basis of
public policy to invalidate a contract, the court then turned to the specific question
of whether the UPA provides such a basis in the case of ITT’s confidentiality
clause. 39
The court began by recognizing that the UPA represents New Mexico
public policy for preventing consumer harm and resolving consumer claims. 40 The
UPA grants broad statutory authority to the AG’s office to investigate violations and
enforce the provisions of the UPA. 41 This authority includes the duty of the
31. Id. (citing Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 55, 304 P.3d at 423 (citing Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033,
¶ 17, 259 P.3d at 810)).
32. Id. (citing Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating
that the FAA’s purpose is “to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more
so”) (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)).
33. Id. ¶ 13, 433 P.3d at 854.
34. Id. (quoting Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, ¶ 20, 76 P.3d 1098, 1105).
35. Id. (quoting Acacia Mut. Life Inc. Co. v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 1990-NMSC-107, ¶ 1, 802 P.2d
11, 12).
36. Id. (citing Berlangieri, 2003-NMSC-024, ¶ 20, 76 P.3d at 1105).
37. Id. ¶ 14, 433 P.3d at 854 (citing First Baptist Church of Roswell v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 2015NMSC-004, ¶ 15, 345 P.3d 310, 314–15; Berlangieri, 2003-NMSC-024, ¶ 53, 76 P.3d at 1113; Acacia
Mut. Life Inc. Co., 1990-NMSC-107, ¶ 11, 802 P.2d at 14; DiGesu v. Weingardt, 1978-NMSC-017, ¶ 7,
575 P.2d 950, 951–52).
38. Id.
39. Id. ¶ 15, 433 P.3d at 854.
40. Id. ¶ 16, 433 P.3d at 854–55 (citing Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 2008-NMSC-046, ¶ 9, 188
P.3d 1215, 1218).
41. Id.
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Consumer Protection Division of the AG’s Office to resolve dissatisfied customers’
complaints, educate citizens about consumers’ rights, and bring suits on behalf of the
public. 42 Such duties of the AG have been deemed by the Supreme Court to
demonstrate the State’s fundamental public policy ensuring that consumers have an
opportunity to “redress their harm.” 43 The court then cited details from the UPA
regarding the AG’s responsibility and process in conducting discovery in furtherance
of public policy. 44
Weighing these considerations, the court concluded that it would be against
public policy to allow ITT to use a confidentiality clause with its students as a shield
against the State’s investigation and litigation as authorized by the UPA. 45 Thus, the
court affirmed the trial court’s granting of the State’s motion to compel production. 46
Further, the court held that ITT’s motion to compel arbitration failed “for the same
reason as its appeal of the district court’s discovery order.” 47
C. Implications
The court’s opinion closes with the statement that it neither considers nor
decides “the propriety of a defendant’s use of an arbitration provision to compel
arbitration or a confidentiality clause to prevent the disclosure of information sought
in a private suit brought under NMSA 1978, Section 57-12-10 (2005) of the UPA.” 48
Though the question was not addressed here, courts and parties have much to gain
from the answer. As arbitration has become a popular contract provision to protect
potential defendants, 49 future UPA plaintiffs will likely confront this issue.
Whereas the State focused its UPA argument on the AG’s statutory power
under the Act, the court’s analysis recognized that power within a broader context of
the UPA’s expression of public policy. 50 The AG’s statutory responsibility under the
UPA is to serve the public interest by preventing consumer harm and resolving
consumer claims. The broad and specific authority granted to the AG to achieve this
public interest is greater than that legislated for private remedies. However, private
UPA plaintiffs have also been granted authority by the legislature to serve the same
public interest, and the courts have affirmed the public value of that authority on
numerous occasions and in varied cases. In that light, ITT Educational Services raises
a reasonable question as to whether the State’s public policy under the UPA can
furnish sufficient authority for such a private plaintiff to effect a result equal or
similar to that achieved by the AG.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 17, 433 P.3d at 855.
Id. ¶ 18, 433 P.3d at 855.
See Leslie, supra note 3.
State ex rel. Balderas, 2018-NMCA-044, ¶¶ 11–16, 433 P.3d at 853–55.
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PART II – THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT: HISTORY AND POLICY
INTERESTS
New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act 51 provides a mechanism of “damages
and other remedial relief for persons damaged by unfair, deceptive, and
unconscionable trade practices.” 52 A typical claim under the UPA consists of three
allegations:
(1) the defendant made an oral or written statement, a visual
description or a representation of any kind that was either false or
misleading; (2) the false or misleading representation was
knowingly made in connection with the sale, lease, rental, or loan
of goods or services in the regular course of the defendant’s
business; and (3) the representation was of the type that may, tends
to,
or
does
deceive
or
mislead
any
person. 53
Though there have been noteworthy changes to the UPA, the gravamen of an unfair
or deceptive trade practice under the statute has remained “a misleading, false, or
deceptive statement made knowingly in connection with the sale of goods or
services.” 54 An unconscionable trade practice under the statute is one that “to a
person’s detriment: (1) takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience
or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or (2) results in a gross disparity
between the value received by a person and the price paid.” 55
A. Legislative History of the UPA
In 1964, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
put forth the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act to supplement existing state
legislation. 56 This proposed legislation was adopted to varying degrees by several
states by 1967, 57 perhaps because its purpose was to unify the laws relating to unfair
competition that had varied greatly by state legislatures applying federal common
law. 58 The Uniform Law aimed to protect consumers from misleading business
practices such as false advertising, trademark infringement, misrepresentation, and
false disparagement. 59
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-2 to 10 (2019) are also referred to as the Unfair Trade Practices Act
(UTPA); see, e.g., Valdez v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1148–49 (D.N.M. 2012).
52. Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 227 P.3d 73, 81.
53. Daye v. Cmty. Fin. Loan Serv. Centers, LLC, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1246 (D.N.M. 2017) (citing
Lohman v. Daimler–Chrysler Corp., 2007-NMCA-100, ¶ 5, 166 P.3d 1091, 1093 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-12-12(D) (2003))).
54. Id. (citing Diversey Corp. v. Chem–Source Corp., 1998-NMCA-112, ¶ 17, 965 P.2d 332, 338).
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2 (2019).
56. Robert F. Dole, Jr., Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485 (1967).
57. Id.
58. A Guide to the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1989, TEX. ARCHIVAL RESOURCES
ONLINE, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utlaw/00040/law-00040p74.html [https://perma.cc/VB43TTP2].
59. Id.
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The Uniform Act addressed a significant problem of consumer protection:
most existing relevant state legislation carried criminal penalties, so only flagrant
abuses were enjoined due to the limited budgets of most enforcing agencies. 60 In
contrast, the Uniform Act empowered “injured merchants . . . and affected
consumers” to pursue private and class actions against any and all deceptive trade
practices that adversely affected the broad marketplace. 61
As proposed to the New Mexico Legislature in 1967 as Senate Bill 233, the
broad scope of the Uniform Act was evident in its listing of thirteen specific “unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 62 (The current
UPA has expanded this list to eighteen items. 63) These ranged from “advertising
goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable public demand” to
“engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding.” 64 In addition, SB233 included clear language empowering the
Attorney General to bring an action in the name of the state whenever he “has
reasonable belief that any person is using or is about to use” an unfair practice and
that such a proceeding would be in the public interest. 65 Practical details for the
Attorney General’s pursuit of such claims were also included from the Uniform
Law. 66
The legislative intent of New Mexico’s UPA is also revealed by the
noteworthy addition to SB233 of the “Private Remedies” section to the enacted
law. 67 While not all states included this text in adopting the Uniform Law, New
Mexico authorized private litigants to pursue claims without “[p]roof of monetary
damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive” being required. 68 Private remedies under
principles of equity and on terms that the court considers reasonable included both
injunctive relief and costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party. 69 As discussed
infra with regard to Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 70 the Washington Court of Appeals
has noted that the public policy interest of awarding attorney fees includes
reimbursing “the individual plaintiff and his counsel for enforcing the Act on behalf
of the general citizenry.’” 71
Amendments to the 1967 law have only served to broaden or strengthen the
authority granted to private litigants. The current UPA includes “restitution” as a
remedy available in addition to injunctive relief. 72 Moreover, private remedies were

60. Dole, supra note 56, at 486.
61. Id.
62. S.B. 233, 28th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1967).
63. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2 (2019).
64. S.B. 233, 28th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1967).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 1967 N.M. Laws, ch. 268 § 8.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1998-NMCA-020, 953 P.2d 1104.
71. Id. ¶ 25, 953 P.2d at 1109 (quoting Brian J. Linn & Gretchen Newman, Comment, Reasonable
Attorneys’ Fees and Treble Damages–Balancing the Scales of Consumer Justice, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 593,
598 (1975)).
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-8 (1977).
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expanded to include actions to recover actual damages or one hundred dollars,
whichever is greater, thus adding individual motivation for private litigants to
advance claims that serve the public interest. 73 Further, on June 19, 1987, the
legislature added the following:
Where the trier of fact finds that the party charged with an unfair
or deceptive trade practice or an unconscionable trade practice has
willfully engaged in the trade practice, the court may award up to
three times actual damages or three hundred dollars ($300),
whichever is greater, to the party complaining of the practice. 74
By this trebling component for actual and statutory damages, the legislature signaled
its clear intention that protection of consumers generally might be effected through
the mechanism of private remedies.
B. Policy Interests of the UPA
Throughout its broad application, the UPA has represented a strong public
policy focused on remedying collective consumer harm and ensuring collective
consumer protection.
One powerful aspect of the UPA’s purpose serving the general public
interest lies in its lack of requirement of a contract or commercial transaction. The
language of Section 57-12-10 directs that a UPA plaintiff may include a person
“likely to be damaged,” and the legislature has provided statutory damages for those
plaintiffs with no direct monetary damage or loss. 75 Further evidence of this
interpretation comes from the federal court for the District of New Mexico, which
recognized in 2018 that the plain language and the relevant statutory provisions of
the UPA “do not require a contract for the sale of goods or services.” 76 The Bar J
Sand & Gravel court’s conclusion cited numerous decisions by the New Mexico
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals that support the proposition that the UPA
does not require the existence of a commercial transaction between parties for a valid
claim. 77
Regarding this aspect of public policy and others, the New Mexico Supreme
Court has explained that it interprets the provisions of the UPA liberally because it
is remedial legislation. 78 In order to accomplish the purposes and intent of the
legislation against all misleading or deceptive statements, the court tries to ensure
that the UPA “lends the protection of its broad application to innocent consumers.” 79
The Truong court demonstrated this deference to legislative intent by explaining its

73. § 57-12-10(B) (2005).
74. Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 1990-NMSC-068, ¶ 17, 795 P.2d 1006, 1011.
75. § 57-12-10 (2005).
76. Bar J Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., No. CV 15-228 SCY/KK, 2018 WL
3128991, at *12 (D.N.M. June 26, 2018).
77. Id. at *11–13.
78. Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 227 P.3d 73, 81.
79. Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, N.A., 1988-NMSC-026, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d 346, 348, overruled
on other grounds by Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-036, ¶ 16, 899 P.2d 576, 583.
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resolution of a statutory ambiguity in favor of general provisions over exceptions. 80
In that case, the court sided with the general remedial consumer protection purposes
of the UPA over the variously-interpreted “expressly permitted” requirement of the
exemption in Section 57-12-7. 81
Further, the Supreme Court has determined that the legislature did not
include any requirement of intent on the part of a UPA defendant. Evidence for this
interpretation is found in Section 57-12-10(B), applying trebled damages when the
charged party is found to have “willfully engaged” with the unfair or deceptive trade
practice or unconscionable trade practice. 82 The Court took this language to indicate
that the legislature anticipated that some statements “would not be intentionally
unfair or deceptive” initially but could become so during the life of the transaction. 83
In the same case, the Supreme Court similarly clarified that the UPA does
not include any requirement of recurring conduct by defendants. 84 In the absence of
any statutory exception for “an isolated occurrence,” the court deferred to the
legislative intent served by the UPA. 85
In conclusion, these examples of courts’ recognition of the UPA’s purpose
to serve public policy are instructive both to the instant case and its related
hypothetical. Against the backdrop of UPA jurisprudence, the ITT court’s holding
appears clearly appropriate to the legislative intent of the statute. Enforcement of the
arbitration provision in ITT’s student enrollment agreement against the AG would
have been directly contrary to the enumerated purposes of the UPA. Additionally,
courts’ awareness of the larger policy purposes of the UPA support the proposition
that enforcement of the arbitration provision against even a private litigant may be
contrary to public policy.
PART III – CASELAW: NEW MEXICO COURTS’ APPLICATION OF
THE UPA
In a wide range of cases, New Mexico courts have consistently recognized
the importance of private remedies under the UPA as an expression of New Mexico’s
strong policy preference for consumer protection. In support of this public policy,
courts often apply equitable doctrines and liberally apply the remedial provisions of
the UPA. In so doing, courts often note the legislative intent behind the UPA as
serving the public interest generally. These consistent features of UPA jurisprudence
support the claim that private UPA plaintiffs may prevail against enforcement of
certain contract provisions if the facts indicate such enforcement would be contrary
to public policy. In other words, the question raised but not answered in ITT
Educational Services may favor the plaintiffs in individual cases.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Quynh Truong, 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 31, 227 P.3d at 82.
See id. ¶¶ 30–66, 227 P.3d at 81–89.
Ashlock, 1988-NMSC-026, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d at 348.
Id. ¶ 5.
See id. ¶ 9.
See id.
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A. New Mexico Supreme Court UPA Jurisprudence
In Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, the New Mexico Supreme
Court determined that, while the UPA should be applied broadly to effect its policy
goal of consumer protection, 86 the Act does not create a cause of action for
competitive business injury. 87 The court ruled that the plaintiff business competitor
lacked standing to bring a UPA claim, because a cause of action to recover lost
profits in competitive injury claims—even as a result of an unfair or deceptive
business practice—falls outside of the “zone of interest” of consumer protection
intended by the legislature. 88 The court reasoned that the legislature’s removal in
1971 of “unfair methods of competition” from the text of the UPA intended to
exclude such claims henceforth. 89
For the private UPA plaintiff envisioned in this Comment, Gandydancer
stands for the proposition that UPA standing is predicated on injury from “prohibited
conduct” as defined by the Act, 90 and ambiguity regarding the zone of interest of the
Act will be resolved by applying “equity, legislative history, or other sources” to
determine “the spirit of the statute.” 91 The court clarified that there is no significant
difference between having standing to sue and having a cause of action under the
UPA, so the key to determining whether a UPA plaintiff has an enforceable “right in
the courts” is to show that the plaintiff’s asserted interests are “arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.” 92 The court clarified
this zone of interests by stating that “the UPA ‘lends the protection of its broad
application to innocent consumers.’” 93 While the question of standing in
Gandydancer would not apply to private consumer plaintiffs, the reasoning in this
case reinforces the readiness of the court to apply the UPA broadly to serve the state’s
consumer protection policy where a claim establishes its interests do fall within the
Act’s zone of interests.
In State ex rel. King v. B & B Investment Group, Inc., the New Mexico
Supreme Court analyzed the “consumer-protective legislative intent” behind the
UPA as it applied to cases of payday lenders charging exorbitant interest rates. 94 The
court noted that the UPA prohibits “the economic exploitation of others,” such as the
86. Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 24, 453 P.3d 434, 441.
87. Id. ¶ 10, 453 P.3d at 438.
88. Id. ¶ 20, 453 P.3d at 440.
89. Id. ¶ 19–20, 453 P.3d at 440. This begs the question of why the legislature did not remove
“disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representations” from its
list of defined unfair or deceptive trade practices. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(8) (2019). It is hard
to imagine anyone other than a business competitor bringing such a claim or showing such injury. Some
aspects of the zone of interest of the UPA may remain unresolved.
90. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 21, 453 P.3d at 440 (citing NMSA §§ 57-12-2(D) and -3
(2019)).
91. Cf. id. ¶ 14, 453 P.3d at 439 (quoting State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 9–10, 98 P.3d 1022,
1025–26).
92. Id. ¶ 8, 453 P.3d at 438 (quoting Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, ¶ 11, 918 P.2d
350, 354); see id. ¶ 17, 453 P.3d at 439 (stating that under the UPA the concepts of injury and zone of
interest are intertwined).
93. Id. ¶ 15, 453 P.3d at 439 (quoting Stevenson v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 1991-NMSC-051, ¶ 12, 811
P.2d 1308, 1311).
94. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 34–35, 329 P.3d 658, 671.
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signature loans in B & B Investment Group, Inc. that carried a finance charge of at
least $999.71 on a $100 loan. 95 The B & B court concluded from the language of the
UPA that the legislature recognized “that, under certain conditions, the market is not
truly free,” and therefore the courts must be empowered to stop or remedy cases of
consumer exploitation. 96 The court declared that the legislature’s intent for the
statute to serve such policy goals was made clear by empowering “the Attorney
General and private citizens to fight unconscionable practices through the UPA.” 97
The court cited other Supreme Court precedents in asserting that it should interpret
the UPA’s provisions liberally to “facilitate and accomplish its purposes and
intent” 98 to protect “innocent consumers.” 99 In addition, the court approved the
reasoning in Williams v. Walker–Thomas Furniture Co. 100 that courts possess the
inherent equitable power to rule a contract substantively unconscionable as contrary
to public policy “[e]ven in the absence of binding precedent or statutory power.” 101
The court stated that the rules of equity “aim at securing substantial justice when the
strict rules of common law might work hardship.” 102
To further clarify the UPA’s public policy, the B & B court examined the
context of other similar statutes, presuming that the legislature “acted with full
knowledge of relevant statutory and common law.” 103 The court inferred that the
legislature intended for the UPA to operate in harmony with public policy as
expressed within existing statutes. Thus, the court inferred a harmonious relationship
between the policy goals of the UPA and the Small Loan Act of 1955, which serves
a “consumer-protective public policy goal” by facilitating the elimination of
exploitation and abuse of borrowers. 104 The court found a similar relationship
between the policy goals of the UPA and the unconscionability clause of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which was adopted in 1961 to prevent “oppression and unfair
surprise” by policing against unconscionable contracts and clauses. 105 This statute
clarifies the courts’ broad remedial power to void or limit the application of a
contract or clause that would otherwise create an unconscionable result. As well, the
court found the UPA shared a consumer-protective public policy with the Money,
Interest, and Usury Act of 1851, which prohibits excessive charges and requires
forfeiture of profits from usury. 106

95. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36, 329 P.3d at 671–72.
96. Id. ¶ 34, 329 P.3d at 671.
97. Id. ¶ 45, 329 P.3d at 674.
98. Id. ¶ 48, 329 P.3d at 675 (quoting Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 227
P.3d 73, 81).
99. Id. (quoting Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, N.A., 1988-NMSC-026, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d 346,
348).
100. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (reversing the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals).
101. State ex rel. King, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 33, 329 P.3d at 670.
102. Id.
103. Id. ¶ 38, 329 P.3d at 672 (quoting State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 1993-NMSC-033, ¶ 4, 855
P.2d 562, 565).
104. Id. ¶ 40, 329 P.3d at 672.
105. Id. ¶ 41, 329 P.3d at 673 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302 cmt. 1 (1978)).
106. Id. ¶¶ 39, 42, 329 P.3d at 672, 673.
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In Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., the Supreme Court recognized that the
UPA represents “[t]he fundamental New Mexico policy of providing consumers a
mechanism for dispute resolution”. 107 The court declared that the UPA is
“unequivocal” in strongly supporting the resolution of consumer claims, regardless
of the scale of the damages alleged. 108 As in B & B Investment Group, the Fiser court
analyzed this public policy of the UPA in the context of its relationship with that of
other relevant statutes, in this case the False Advertising Act and the Consumer
Protection Division of the Attorney General’s Office. 109 The court noted the
connected policies of those statutes to the UPA as including the empowerment of
private individuals to brings claims on behalf of the public 110 and ensuring that
consumers have an opportunity to redress their harms. 111
The Fiser court applied the UPA in holding that a class action ban in the
arbitration provision of a computer sales contract violated New Mexico public
policy. 112 Despite New Mexico policy to respect choice-of-law provisions, the court
declined to apply Texas law since the application thereof “would ‘violate some
fundamental principle of justice’” 113 by removing a viable “mechanism for
[consumers’] dispute resolution.” 114 Here the court clarified that public policy in
New Mexico seeks to achieve greater consumer protection than that allowed under
Texas law: the court concluded that Texas law would likely enforce the provision
against class actions, thus effectively precluding individual clients from gaining
relief for the claim of only ten to twenty dollars per computer. 115 The court
recognized that the UPA applies to such plaintiff claims since the statute “was clearly
drafted to include a remedy for small claims” 116 and because it specifically identifies
class actions as a private remedy. 117 The court reached its holding despite
assuming—in light of dispute between the parties—that the plaintiff had agreed to
the defendant’s “terms and conditions.” 118 Thus, the holding here demonstrates the
court’s willingness to apply equity to achieve fundamental public policy as
represented by the UPA.
In Hale v. Basin Motor Co., the Supreme Court’s holding and dicta
demonstrate several applications of the Unfair Trade Practices Act that serve relevant
public policy. 119 First, the Hale court approved the lower court’s trebling of damages
based on the defendant’s willful failure to disclose prior damages to the automobile
that was sold to the plaintiffs. 120 The court reasoned that disclosure by affidavit is

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 2008-NMSC-046, ¶ 10, 188 P.3d 1215, 1218–19.
Id. ¶ 9, 188 P.3d at 1218 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-3 (1978)).
Id. ¶¶ 9–11, 188 P.3d at 1218–19.
Id. ¶ 10, 188 P.3d at 1218–19.
Id. ¶ 11, 188 P.3d at 1219.
Id. ¶ 25, 188 P.3d at 1222.
Id. ¶ 7, 188 P.3d at 1218.
Id. ¶ 10, 188 P.3d at 1218–19.
Id. ¶ 7, 188 P.3d at 1218.
Id. ¶ 9, 188 P.3d at 1218.
Id. ¶ 13, 188 P.3d at 1219.
Id. ¶ 4, 188 P.3d at 1217–18.
See generally Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 1990-NMSC-068, 795 P.2d 1006.
Id. ¶¶ 7, 10–11, 795 P.2d at 1009, 1011–12 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-6(B) (1995)).

176

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 1

required by Section 57-12-6(B) to protect consumers’ reasonable expectations such
as the perceived value of the purchased automobile. 121 Since remedial statutes are
applied retroactively, 122 the court approved the increased damages for the willful
trade practice on the 1985 sale despite the trebling provision being added to the
statute on June 19, 1987. 123 The court reasoned that the provision was not a new
duty, right or obligation, but instead provided a new remedy for an already
established substantive right under the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 124
Further, the Hale court discussed policy considerations for consumers
regarding damages and appellate attorney fees. The plaintiffs claimed on appeal that
their “damages and costs” included “lost paid vacation time” that had been spent
preparing for and attending depositions and trial. 125 Since the plaintiffs had listed
this at trial as costs only, the alleged amount could not be included at appeal as
damages. 126 Thus, the court did not award these alleged costs, since the trial court
did not demonstrate abuse of discretion. 127 However, the court stated that it “may
have looked favorably” on such a damages claim if properly raised, since such
damages serve to remedy the “frustration experienced by consumers having to run
around to straighten out unfair or deceptive trade practices.” 128 Finally, the Hale
court approved of the plaintiffs’ argument on cross-appeal that they were entitled to
appellate attorney fees and costs under Section 57-12-10(C). 129 The court reasoned
that awarding attorney fees and costs on appeal serves “the statutory purpose of
creating a private remedy to redress wrongs resulting from unfair or deceptive trade
practices.” 130 Reinforcing the public policy of the statute, the court concluded that
such awards to successful appellate litigants “make[] the private remedy an effective
one.” 131
B. New Mexico Court of Appeals UPA Jurisprudence
In Lohman v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., the New Mexico Court of Appeals
analyzed the language, historical purpose, and public policy of the UPA in
determining that the Act warrants the “broadest possible application.” 132 In Lohman,
a class action lawsuit against an automobile manufacturer and the manufacturer of
allegedly defective seatbelts, the court rejected numerous interpretations of UPA
requirements that had been advanced by the defendants. 133 Notably, the court held
that the UPA does not require a direct commercial transaction between a claimant

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. ¶ 18, 795 P.2d at 1011–12 (citing Gray v. Armijo, 1962-NMSC-082, 372 P.2d 821).
Id. ¶ 17, 795 P.2d at 1011.
Id. ¶ 18, 795 P.2d at 1011–12.
Id. ¶ 24, 795 P.2d at 1013.
Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 795 P.2d at 1013.
Id. ¶ 25, 795 P.2d at 1013.
Id. ¶ 24, 795 P.2d at 1013.
Id. ¶ 26–27, 795 P.2d at 1013–14.
Id. ¶ 27, 795 P.2d at 1013–14.
Id.
Lohman v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 2007-NMCA-100, ¶ 25, 166 P.3d 1091, 1096–97.
See generally id. ¶ 20–40, 166 P.3d at 1095–99.
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and a defendant, 134 a ruling that has been cited in many subsequent cases. 135 Rather,
the court stated that the UPA “seems designed to encompass a broad array of
commercial relationships” based on its prohibition against “misrepresentations
‘made in connection with the sale . . . of goods or services . . . by a person in the
regular course of his trade or commerce.’” 136 The court’s plain language analysis
focused on the Act’s use of broad language such as “in connection with,” 137 “[a]ny
person,” 138 and “as a result of any,” 139 leading to the court’s conclusion that the
legislature intended the UPA to have a scope “broad enough to encompass
misrepresentations which bear on downstream sales by and between third parties.” 140
The court found policy support for this position in the remedial purpose of the Act
and “the principle favoring liberal application” thereof. 141
The court’s broad interpretation and application of the UPA in Lohman
favors potential claims in which the plaintiff’s injury does not present a typical
transactional consumer. This interpretation and application centered on the manner
in which alleged misrepresentations are made under the Act, 142 and included the
conclusion that the UPA’s focus on false or deceptive advertising was directed at
remedying harm to the public at large, as consumers. 143 The court applied this
reasoning further in stating that the UPA reaches misrepresentations made by and
between third parties in the course of commercial transactions, “particularly when
misrepresentations are designed to enable a manufacturer to sell a product to
consumers.” 144 As well, the court rejected the argument that the UPA requires a
plaintiff to allege detrimental reliance, since the Act “does not require that the
defendant’s conduct actually deceive a consumer; it permits recovery even if the
conduct only ‘tends to deceive.’” 145 Finally, the court found sufficient support under
the UPA for the plaintiff’s theory of deliberate concealment and non-disclosure in
relation to indirect misrepresentations. 146 The court concluded that the Act “imposes
a duty to disclose material facts reasonably necessary to prevent any [other]
statements from being misleading.” 147 The range of the Lohman court’s
interpretation and application of the UPA lends support to arguments under the Act
generally that use policy or legislative intent to assert public interests.
134. Cf. id. ¶ 25–26, 166 P.3d at 1096–97.
135. See, e.g., Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 31, 453 P.3d 434,
443; Dollens v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015-NMCA-096, ¶ 17, 356 P.3d 531, 538; Hicks v. Eller, 2012NMCA-061, ¶ 19, 280 P.3d 304, 309.
136. Lohman, 2007-NMCA-100, ¶ 21, 166 P.3d at 1096 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)
(2019)) (emphasis added).
137. § 57-12-2(D).
138. § 57-12-10(B) (2005).
139. Id.
140. Lohman, 2007-NMCA-100, ¶ 30, 166 P.3d at 1097.
141. Id. ¶ 31, 166 P.3d at 1097.
142. See id. ¶ 6, 166 P.3d at 1093.
143. Id. ¶ 22, 166 P.3d at 1096.
144. Id. ¶ 26, 166 P.3d at 1097.
145. Id. ¶ 35, 166 P.3d at 1098 (quoting Smoot v. Physicians Life Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-027, ¶ 21,
87 P.3d 545, 550 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(14) (2019))).
146. Id. ¶ 39–40, 166 P.3d at 1098–99.
147. Id. ¶ 40, 166 P.3d at 1099 (quoting Smoot, 2004-NMCA-027, ¶ 15, 87 P.3d at 549).

178

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 1

In Aguilera v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., the Court of Appeals expressly
asserted the public policy value of encouraging private individuals to pursue UPA
claims and of reimbursing such individuals and their attorneys for enforcing the
UPA. 148 The court considered that the public interest served by such UPA claims
justifies the awarding of attorney fees, since such fees could well exceed the size of
the judgment in question. 149 Thus, even on appeal the court should apply the UPA’s
statutory provision regarding awarding of attorney fees to serve “the goal of
encouraging plaintiffs to pursue justice even where the damages are minor in
nature.” 150 The court’s consideration here of the UPA’s public purposes supports the
position that disincentives to pursuing UPA claims for even small amounts should
be removed. 151
It is noteworthy that the Aguilera court found the defendant’s argument
unpersuasive that, unlike the current arbitration statute, the arbitration act under
which the initial dispute arose contained no provision for the awarding of
“reasonable attorney’s fees.” 152 The defendant had a reasonable argument here, since
the earlier version of the Uniform Arbitration Act stated that the “expenses of
arbitration ‘not including counsel fees . . . shall be paid as provided in the award.’” 153
However, the court determined that the trial court may award attorney fees as
authorized by the applicable law, and in this case the underlying cause of action was
pursuant to the UPA including its provision regarding attorney fees. 154
Pursuant to the public interest served by the awarding of attorney fees, the
court went even further regarding a prior concession of attorney fees by the
plaintiff. 155 In the previous appeal of the case, the plaintiff had voluntarily given up
her claim to attorney fees relating to “post-arbitration fees incurred in the district
court.” 156 The court recognized this concession but rejected the defendant’s
contention that res judicata should apply and extend the concession to the plaintiff’s
claim for attorney fees on appeal. Here again the defendant had a reasonable claim,
as res judicata bars subsequent claims where a previous claim involved (1) identical
parties; (2) acting in an identical capacity; (3) litigating the identical cause of action;
and (4) with respect to the same subject matter. 157 However, the court deemed the
cause of action and the subject matter here to be distinct from the previous claim in
trial court, since the instant case was for fees incurred at the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court. 158 The court found sufficient distinction in the plaintiff having raised
the issue in her appellate briefs, and thus her UPA-supported claim prevailed over

148. Aguilera v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 2004-NMCA-120, ¶ 10, 99 P.3d 672, 676 (citing Jones v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 1998-NMCA-020, ¶ 25, 953 P.2d 1104, 1109).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. ¶¶ 10–11, 99 P.3d at 676.
152. Id. ¶ 13, 99 P.3d at 676 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7A-22(b) (2001) and 44-7-10 (1971)).
153. Id. (quoting § 44-7-10).
154. Id. ¶ 14, 99 P.3d at 676.
155. Id. ¶¶ 17–19, 99 P.3d at 677–78.
156. Id. ¶ 18, 99 P.3d at 677–78.
157. Id. ¶ 19, 99 P.3d at 678 (citing Moffat v. Branch, 2002-NMCA-067, ¶ 14, 49 P.3d 673, 677; Bank
of Santa Fe v. Marcy Plaza Associates, 2002-NMCA-014, ¶ 13, 40 P.3d 442, 445).
158. Id.
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defendant’s
res
judicata
argument. 159
The Aguilera court cited Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp. in stating that public
policy is served by awarding fees on appeal of UPA claims. 160 In holding for the
plaintiff’s right to recover attorney fees under the UPA, the Jones court noted with
approval the rationale offered by the Washington Court of Appeals for that state’s
Consumer Protection Act: “(1) on the individual level, to enable the injured plaintiff
to pursue his own claim; and, (2) on the public level, to reimburse the individual
plaintiff and his counsel for enforcing the Act on behalf of the general citizenry.” 161
The Jones court further observed that the purpose of awarding attorneys’ fees and
costs under similar statutes is to encourage private plaintiffs to pursue their claims
where attorneys may be reluctant to represent consumer claims with smaller
recoveries. 162 Thus, the court reasoned, attorney fees in such cases are not just
nominal and should in fact “reflect the full amount of fees fairly and reasonably
incurred by Plaintiff in securing an award under the UPA.” 163
the

C. Conclusion
UPA jurisprudence indicates a strong willingness by courts to recognize and
enforce the legislatively intended power of the Act to serve public interests of
consumer protection. In service to this purpose, courts are willing to apply equity to
secure substantial justice when it falls within their power to do so. Caselaw
demonstrates further that courts see unity between the UPA and other statutes that
express public policy interests, thus lending weight to courts’ authority to apply
equity under such circumstances.
Additionally, UPA caselaw generally indicates little significant separation
between the role of the AG and the role of private litigants in terms of public policy
interests. In recent UPA cases involving the AG as a party, the courts recognized the
enhanced statutory authority of the AG as serving the same consumer protection
goals as those served by private litigants. 164 In a related instance, the Court of
Appeals in Atherton v. Gopin treated the AG and private litigants as concurrent
plaintiffs, where the trial court had heard their shared motion for summary judgment
and combined oral argument on the motions. 165 Thus, UPA jurisprudence supports
the theory that (1) private litigants serve the same public policy interests as the AG
in ensuring that consumers have an opportunity to redress their harm, and (2) such
litigants may receive equity to void a contract provision that is contrary to public
policy.

159. Id.
160. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1998-NMCA-020, ¶ 25, 953 P.2d 1104, 1109).
161. Jones, 1998-NMCA-020, ¶ 25, 953 P.2d at 1109 (quoting Linn & Newman, supra note 71); see
also Atherton v. Gopin, 2012-NMCA-023, ¶ 8, 272 P.3d 700, 702 (stating that absent reasonable attorney
fees, “prospective plaintiffs might have difficulty pursuing their claims and enforcing the UPA on behalf
of the public”).
162. Jones, 1998-NMCA-020, ¶ 25, 953 P.2d at 1109 (citing Linn & Newman, supra note 71).
163. Id.
164. See generally State ex rel. King, 2014-NMSC-024, 329 P.3d 658; State ex rel. Balderas, 2018NMCA-044, 421 P.3d 849.
165. Atherton, 2015-NMCA-013, ¶¶ 13–15, 272 P.3d at 703–04.
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PART IV – UNCONSCIONABILITY ANALYSIS AND
COUNTERARGUMENTS
Against the long and broad backdrop of the UPA’s legislative intent and
judicial application, the hypothetical private claimant of this Comment has multiple
opportunities to prevail but also faces multiple obstacles.
Initially, the degree of clarity of the complaint itself may contribute to the
court’s evaluation of the claim’s legitimacy as a UPA case. 166 A proper UPA
complaint should make clear which facts will be applied to prove which issues. 167
As stated above, this Comment envisions a private litigant raising a claim against a
private institution for alleged misrepresentations regarding promised results of its
educational degrees. 168 These misrepresentations may include regard held for such a
degree by potential employers or the professional community; high-paying jobs
awaiting the degree holder; or the services provided by the institution to ensure
professional placement. The facts in the complaint may support allegations of unfair
or deceptive trade practices under the UPA such as “representing that goods or
services are of a particular standard, quality or grade”; “using exaggeration, innuendo
or ambiguity as to a material fact or failing to state a material fact if doing so deceives
or tends to deceive”; or “failing to deliver the quality or quantity of goods or services
contracted for.” 169 In addition, the facts in the complaint may support allegations of
unconscionable trade practices under the UPA that took advantage of the disparity
in the plaintiff’s knowledge to a grossly unfair degree or resulted in a gross disparity
between the value received by the plaintiff and the price paid.
Presuming the complaint’s facts and allegations sufficiently support a UPA
claim, the question here is whether a subsequent motion by the defendant to enforce
an arbitration clause in a student enrollment agreement could be voided by the court.
The court would first conduct unconscionability analysis of the contract provisions
under question if such a claim had been raised by the plaintiff. While the defendant
would bear the initial burden to prove the arbitration provision to be valid, the
plaintiff would then bear the burden to show the provision to be unconscionable. 170
If a contract provision under question survives unconscionability analysis,
then a court applying contract law would enforce the provision unless a plaintiff
demonstrates a sufficient basis for voiding the provision, such as the provision being
contrary to public policy. The plaintiff’s position would have to withstand significant
counterarguments available to a defendant.
A. Unconscionability Analysis
Rooted in public policy, unconscionability doctrine is one of several “welldefined equitable exceptions” that justify a court rendering an agreement

166.
20.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See Heimann v. Kinder-Morgan CO2 Co., L.P., 2006-NMCA-127, ¶¶ 25–26, 144 P.3d 111, 119–
See id.
See supra at 2.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(7), (14), (17) (2009).
Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 45, 304 P.3d 409, 420–21.
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unenforceable. 171 An agreement is deemed unconscionable when it is unreasonably
unfavorable to one side and precludes the other party from making a meaningful
choice. 172 A contract provision may be struck down as either substantively
unconscionable or procedurally unconscionable or a combination of both. 173
To determine if any contract is substantively unconscionable, a court
analyzes the contract terms on their face to analyze whether they are commercially
reasonable, fair, and consistent with public policy. 174 A substantively
unconscionable contract is one in which the provisions are “grossly unreasonable
and against our public policy under the circumstances.” 175 New Mexico courts have
found contracts to be substantively unconscionable due to the terms being one-sided
and unreasonably benefitting one party over the other. 176
To determine if a contract is procedurally unconscionable, a court analyzes
the “factual circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, including the
relative bargaining strength, sophistication of the parties, and the extent to which
either party felt free to accept or decline terms demanded by the other.” 177
Procedurally unconscionable contracts may include contracts of adhesion, wherein a
party with superior bargaining power offers standardized terms without the weaker
side having recourse to negotiate or bargain for those terms. 178 In such a contract of
adhesion, contract terms that are “patently unfair” to the weaker party create a
procedurally unconscionable agreement. 179
In the hypothetical case of this Comment, a student enrollment agreement
could be deemed substantively unconscionable, for example, if the provisions bound
the parties to arbitration only in matters likely to be raised by students. 180 The same
agreement could be deemed procedurally unconscionable, for example, if enrolling
students were given no opportunity to bargain for terms that bound them to patently

171. Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 21, 208 P.3d 901, 907 (citing
Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 1985-NMSC-106, ¶ 16, 709 P.2d 675, 679; Builders Contract Interiors, Inc.
v. Hi-Lo Industries, Inc., 2006-NMCA-053, ¶ 8, 134 P.3d 795, 798 (listing unconscionability, mistake,
fraud, and illegality as equitable exceptions justifying deviation from the parties’ contract).
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 2008-NMSC-046, ¶ 20, 188 P.3d 1215, 1221); see also
Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 32, 304 P.3d at 417.
174. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 33, 304 P.3d at 417–18; see also State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv.
Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 32, 329 P.3d 658, 670; Fiser, 2008-NMSC-046, ¶ 20, 188 P.3d at 1221.
175. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 33, 304 P.3d at 417–18 (quoting Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶
31, 208 P.3d at 909).
176. See id. ¶ 34 (citing Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 53–54, 259 P.3d
803, 818–19); see also Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 26–27, 32, 208 P.3d at 908–09, 910; Figueroa v.
THI of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 2013-NMCA-077, ¶ 30, 306 P.3d 480, 491–92.
177. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 35, 304 P.3d at 418 (quoting Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 23,
208 P.3d at 907–08); see also State ex rel. King, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 12–13, 329 P.3d at 665. But see
Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc. 2011-NMCA-094, ¶¶ 43–47, 265 P.3d 720, 732–
33.
178. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 35, 304 P.3d at 418 (citing Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 44, 259
P.3d at 817).
179. Id.
180. See Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 26–27, 208 P.3d at 908–09.
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unfair provisions. 181 In either result, a finding of unconscionability would result in
the court voiding the arbitration provision under question.
B. Counterarguments
An arbitration provision that survives unconscionability analysis presents
the central issue of this Comment: could the provision then be voided by a plaintiff’s
motion to deny enforcement based on the provision being contrary to public policy?
A defendant’s challenge to such a motion could be based in any of several
counterarguments.
(1) State and national policy favoring arbitration
Defendants in UPA cases have argued that state and federal policy strongly
favor arbitration, and thus courts are “generally bound” to enforce arbitration
provisions. 182 Arbitration is recognized by courts as an alternative form of dispute
resolution that may serve to relieve judicial congestion, speed up resolution of
disputes, and do so economically. 183 UPA defendants cite the New Mexico Uniform
Arbitration Act 184 and the Federal Arbitration Act 185 as binding authorities that
require enforcement of an arbitration provision unless it violates established contract
principles at law or in equity. 186 UPA defendants further argue that the FAA
preempts state law as the act represents Congress’s express intent “to counteract
judicial hostility to arbitration” and to ensure that states treat arbitration agreements
equally with other contracts. 187
However, New Mexico courts have clarified that the reach of the UAA and
the FAA does not extend protection to arbitration agreements any greater than exists
for any other form of contract. 188 In this regard, the New Mexico Supreme Court has
quoted the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement that state regulation of contracts may
include the “invalidat[ion of] an arbitration clause” on the same basis of revocation
as any other contract. 189 Thus, when a court applies scrutiny to an arbitration clause
consistent with its scrutiny of contracts generally, the scrutiny does not constitute
181. See State ex rel. King, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 12–13, 329 P.3d at 665.
182. See McMillan v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2004-NMSC-002, ¶ 9, 84 P.3d 65, 69.
183. Id. But see Judith Resnick, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005) (noting
benefits and limitations of ADR including arbitration).
184. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7A-1 to -32 (2001).
185. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
186. Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 26–27, 49, 304 P.3d 409,
416, 421 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947) (stating that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”)); see
also Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 35, 208 P.3d 901, 910.
187. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 51, 304 P.3d at 422 (quoting Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 2008NMSC-046, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d 1215, 1222); see also State ex rel. Balderas v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc.,, 2018NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 421 P.3d 849, 853–54 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289
(2002)).
188. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 49, 304 P.3d at 421; see also Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 36,
208 P.3d at 910–11; Fiser, 2008-NMSC-046, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d at 1222; Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa
Arena Blanca, LLC, 2013-NMCA-077, ¶ 21, 306 P.3d 480, 489–90.
189. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 31, 304 P.3d at 417 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996)); see also Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 36, 208 P.3d at 910–11.
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disparate treatment of arbitration clauses, and preemption does not apply. 190 Courts
cannot refuse to enforce arbitration clauses based on defenses specific to arbitration,
but generally applicable contract analysis does not violate the purposes and
objectives of Congress as expressed in the FAA. 191 The state Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress’s legitimate purposes behind the FAA are violated when
businesses use “one-sided, unfair, and legally unconscionable arbitration schemes”
to take advantage of consumers. 192 Thus, the court “will not allow our courts to be
used to enforce unconscionable arbitration clauses any more than [it] will allow them
to be used to enforce any other unconscionable contract in New Mexico.” 193
Therefore, the hypothetical UPA plaintiff of this Comment could prevail
here provided the claim follows general contract law principles and does not attack
arbitration provisions per se. The claim in ITT Educational Services illustrated this
principle as the plaintiff AG contested enforcement of both confidentiality and
arbitration provisions.
(2) Concepcion doctrine prohibiting state rules that target arbitration
Since AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion was decided in 2011, defendants
seeking to enforce arbitration have argued that the U.S. Supreme Court therein ruled
state courts’ unconscionability analysis of arbitration generally to be preempted by
the FAA. 194 This interpretation of Concepcion asserts that the court’s overturning of
California’s blanket invalidation of class action waivers in arbitration agreements
closes the door generally to consumer protection class actions. 195 Courts have
articulated the broad potential impact of Concepcion as “foreclose[ing] the
possibility of any recovery for many wronged individuals” 196 and “casting
significant doubt on virtually any ‘device [or] formula’ which might be a vehicle for
‘judicial hostility toward arbitration.”‘ 197 Scholars have argued that the court’s
holding and its focus on “fundamental attributes” of arbitration portend FAA
preemption of most if not all state unconscionability doctrine. 198 Within New Mexico
jurisprudence, this interpretation further contends that Concepcion extends to
effectively overturn prominent UPA cases such as Fiser and Cordova. 199
However, New Mexico courts and other legal authorities have clarified the
limits of Concepcion to essentially require case-by-case analysis of
190. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 49, 304 P.3d at 421 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333 (2011)); see also Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 36–37, 208 P.3d at 910–11; Fiser, 2008NMSC-046, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d at 1222.
191. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 52, 304 P.3d at 422; see also State ex rel. Balderas, 2018NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 421 P.3d at 853–54; Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 36–38, 208 P.3d at 910–11.
192. Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 34–38, 208 P.3d at 910–11.
193. Id.
194. Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 2013-NMCA-077, ¶¶ 11–12, 306 P.3d 480,
485–86; see also Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 51–52, 304 P.3d at 422.
195. Megan Barnett, There Is Still Hope for the Little Guy: Unconscionability Is Still A Defense
Against Arbitration Clauses Despite AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 651 (2012).
196. Id. at 670 n.4 (quoting Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d. 1280, 1288 (D. Colo. 2011)).
197. Id. (quoting D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 331 (D. Conn. 2011)).
198. Richard Frankel, Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion: Why Unconscionability Survives the
Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 225, 227 (2014).
199. See Figueroa, 2013-NMCA-077, ¶ 12, 306 P.3d at 486.
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unconscionability in arbitration agreements involving consumer protection class
actions. 200 The scope of Concepcion is restricted to prohibiting states from issuing
blanket rules that employ generally applicable contract doctrines, such as
unconscionability, “in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.” 201 The Figueroa court
recognized that a broad interpretation of Concepcion would be contradictory to the
court’s reasoning therein, as special exemption from unconscionability analysis
would “place arbitration agreements on an unequal footing” from other contracts. 202
Therefore, the saving clause in the FAA applies to rules that do not “directly target[]
a specific term of an agreement or a class of agreements.” 203 Further, the Figueroa
court recognized that the New Mexico Supreme Court in its post-Concepcion
holding in Rivera reaffirmed its relevant pre-Concepcion unconscionability holding
in Cordova. 204 Thus, New Mexico courts have recognized that the state’s policy of
general applicability contract analysis remains a valid equitable remedy on a caseby-case basis in light of Concepcion.
Therefore, the hypothetical UPA plaintiff of this Comment could prevail
here provided the courts remain consistent in their interpretation of Concepcion.
Under the narrow interpretation applied thus far by New Mexico courts, a private
UPA litigant would not violate Concepcion doctrine by pursuing a claim that places
all classes of agreements on equal footing.
(3) Applicable scope policy favoring arbitration
The nature of a UPA allegation is likely to exceed the subject matter of the
underlying contract. Nonetheless, some defendants argue that courts should read the
scope of arbitration clauses to generally apply to particular claims, thus requiring
enforcement of such clauses. This applicable scope argument has been asserted under
both narrow and broad arbitration provisions. 205 The applicable scope argument
draws its authority from the FAA’s language asserting that “any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” 206 Proponents of this theory argue

200. See id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 306 P.3d at 486, 487 (citing Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC033, ¶¶ 16, 42, 259 P.3d 803, 810, 816 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333
(2011) for a general rule of law, but concluding that NMSC precedent controls)); see also Clay v. N.M.
Title Loans, Inc., 2012-NMCA-102, ¶ 8, 288 P.3d 888, 893 (citing Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 2008NMSC-046, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d 1215, 1222); Frankel, supra note 199, at 253 (stating that Concepcion
“authorizes state courts and legislatures to regulate adhesive agreements in a way that preserves choice
instead of taking it away”).
201. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 334.
202. Figueroa, 2013-NMCA-077, ¶ 14, 306 P.3d at 486.
203. Id. ¶ 13, 306 P.3d at 486 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336–52).
204. Id. ¶ 15, 306 P.3d at 487 (citing Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 16, 42, 259 P.3d at 810, 816 (citing
Concepcion for a general rule of law)).
205. See McMillan v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2004-NMSC-002, 84 P.3d 65; see also Heimann v. KinderMorgan CO2 Co., L.P., 2006-NMCA-127, 144 P.3d 111; Santa Fe Techs., Inc. v. Argus Networks, Inc.,
2002-NMCA-030, 42 P.3d 1221.
206. Clay v. N.M. Title Loans, Inc., 2012-NMCA-102, ¶ 7, 288 P.3d 888, 892–93 (citing Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)).
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that arbitration is proper where an agreement’s scope can be read to encompass the
plaintiffs’ claims. 207
However, courts apply careful scrutiny to the scope of arbitration
agreements and may deny enforcement of such agreements if the nature of the
complaint does not fall clearly within such scope, whether narrow or broad. In
Heimann v. Kinder-Morgan CO2 Co., the court clarified that a narrow arbitration
agreement should be enforced only regarding matters that fall within the scope which
the parties negotiated and agreed upon. 208 The Heimann court could not determine
that the claims raised were covered by the narrow arbitration clause targeting nonqualified contract or transportation prices, and therefore enforcement of the clause
would be inappropriate. 209 In Santa Fe Techs., Inc., v. Argus Networks, Inc., the court
clarified that arbitration clauses that “are drafted with broad strokes . . . require broad
interpretation,” but that even such broad clauses are limited in applicability to the
subject matter of the underlying contract. 210 The parties’ broad agreement in Santa
Fe Techs. stated clearly that arbitration would be the “sole and exclusive remedy . . .
respecting any dispute, protest, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement.” 211 Nonetheless, the court found no “overlap” between the subject
matter of the broad agreement and the subject matter of the plaintiffs’ claims of
tortious substitution of another company to the contracted merger. 212 The court
recognized that parties possess the freedom to contract to arbitration for all disputes,
but there the nature of the claims exceeded the scope of the negotiated agreement,
even with such a broad arbitration clause. 213
Therefore, the hypothetical UPA plaintiff of this Comment could prevail
here provided the scope of the claim exceeds the scope of the arbitration agreement.
The student enrollment agreement in ITT Educational Services used broad terms to
bind “without limitation, any statutory, tort, contract or equity claim” to
arbitration. 214 Nonetheless, the nature of an allegation of an unfair or deceptive act
or an unconscionable act is likely to exceed the subject matter of the underlying
contract. 215 UPA claims are likely to include allegations that fall outside of the scope
of the underlying transaction or negotiated relationship. 216 Thus, even the broad
language of ITT’s adhesive student enrollment agreement might not shield such a
defendant from litigation.

207. Santa Fe Techs., Inc., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 54, 42 P.3d at 1238.
208. Heimann, 2006-NMCA-127, ¶ 13, 144 P.3d at 115–6.
209. Id. ¶ 25, 144 P.3d at 119 (citing Cummings v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 404 F.3d 1258,
1262 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[i]n construing the scope of a narrow arbitration clause, we must take
care to carry out the specific and limited intent of parties”)).
210. Santa Fe Techs., Inc., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 55, 42 P.3d at 1238.
211. Id. ¶ 53, 42 P.3d at 1238.
212. Id. ¶¶ 55–56, 42 P.3d at 1238–39.
213. Id. ¶¶ 55–57, 42 P.3d at 1238–39.
214. State ex rel. Balderas v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 2018-NMCA-044, ¶ 2, 421 P.3d 849, 851.
215. Heimann v. Kinder-Morgan CO2 Co., L.P., 2006-NMCA-127, ¶ 25 144 P.3d 111, 119 (citing
Cummings v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 404 F.3d 1258, 1262 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[i]n
construing the scope of a narrow arbitration clause, we must take care to carry out the specific and limited
intent of parties”)).
216. See Daye v. Cmty. Fin. Loan Serv. Centers, LLC, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1245–46 (D.N.M. 2017).
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CONCLUSION
In ITT Educational Services, the Court of Appeals rightly denied the
defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. Given the AG plaintiff, the court’s
decision was made easier to reach by the statutory language of the UPA directing the
AG’s role and responsibilities. However, the court’s holding was rooted not in the
AG’s status but in public policy interests served by the Act generally and the AG
specifically. Private UPA litigants serve the same public policy interests as the AG,
and thus courts often apply equity where such plaintiffs bring claims to redress
consumer harm. Given the legislative intent and broad jurisprudence of the UPA, a
private litigant may prevail where a defendant attempts to enforce a contract
provision such as an arbitration clause to block litigation that would serve these
public policy interests. Such a plaintiff must navigate many considerations, but the
UPA presents a positive mechanism of consumer protection to potentially void a
contract provision that is contrary to public policy.

